

25X1

2 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Greg Rushford on 2 October 1975

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1. Rushford came to my office by pre-arrangement through [] to discuss the record with respect to Portugal.

2. We spent some time at the beginning in a back and forth discussion on Cyprus and the press stories of yesterday and this morning alleging that the CIA knew of the coup, failed to tell the Ambassador, and promised the government it wouldn't happen. I made clear my opinions of the unrealism of that line and he dealt with it by refusing to take responsibility for what his superiors on the committee staff said. He indicated intent to talk more to the DDO people.

3. On the subject of Portugal, he was particularly interested in the warning record supplied by intelligence before the 25 April coup. We discussed the various indications that the old regime was coming to an end, the current intelligence coverage of these (OCI did over twenty articles on unrest and uncertainty in Portugal between 5 March and 25 April 1974). OCI was preparing an analytical round-up, "Cracks in the Facade," at my request, when 25 April came. We also discussed the limitations on DDO ability to cover opposition groups with [] with an incumbent government.

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4. We spent a considerable amount of time on general questions of what can and cannot be predicted in intelligence. And he finally asked me many questions about the differences between the NIO system for producing estimates and the former BNE system. He is clearly primed and determined to promote debate on which was better, the NIO or the BNE, and I could only say it depends on what your perspectives and needs are, describe strengths and weaknesses of both, etc., etc. I did try to dispel the simple-minded notion that the old system would have guaranteed advance and precise warning of the coup, and in general discussed the differences between current- and long-range analysis and estimating.

MORI/CDF Pages

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5. Although Rushford is hardly one to be trusted on the record of performance so far, his line today was one of entire reasonableness and a general posture of wanting to strengthen civilian intelligence. He was very kindly in his references to Bill Colby.

6. He did say that the committee would be holding hearings on Portugal next Tuesday (7 October) but had no idea now who, if anybody, would be called.


National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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cc:



Wilson
Thuermer
Carver ✓

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Approved For Release 2006/06/02 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500100010-0

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

DCI/NIO

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

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INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

2 October 1975

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)


SSC

Greg Rushford

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HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents: give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)



STAT

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Portugal and Cyprus
Intelligence Prediction
Estimative Process (NIO vs BNE)

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)